Credit rating agencies play a crucial role in …nancial markets. There are two competing views regarding their behavior: some argue that they engage in rating in ‡ation, while others suggest that they de ‡ate ratings. This article o¤ers a rationale that reconciles the two opposite arguments. We …nd that both rating in ‡ation and rating de ‡ation can occur in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that credit rating is procyclical: rating in ‡ation is more likely to happen in a boom while rating de ‡ation is more likely to happen in a recession.
Introduction
The "Big Three" credit rating agencies (CRAs), Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, have played a critical role in the capital markets by assessing and spreading information about default likelihoods and recovery rates of securities. Credit ratings Chen: Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder, email:
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Gu and Yao: School of Management, Fudan University, email: yzy@fudan.edu.cn. We thank the comments and suggestions by seminar participants at Zhejiang University, the SAET conference, and the IOMS workshp. This research is supported by China National Natural Science Foundation (71273063), China Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Program (12YJC790236), and Fudan Financial Research Center (2012FDFRCGD16). The usual caveat applies. 1 "EU leaders blame the euro crisis on American credit rating agencies" by Daniel Hannan, The Telegraph, July 7th, 2011. 2 Securities and Exchange Commission (2008, page 12) assigned by them have profound impacts on the welfare of both borrowers and investors. Favorable ratings allow …rms or countries to borrow at better terms and thus positively a¤ect their values or economies. The ratings allow uninformed investors to quickly evaluate the risk properties of numerous individual securities by a well-known simple rating symbol, and are thus used extensively in their investment decisions. In fact, many investment policies or government regulations are built on credit ratings. For example, some institutional investors, such as pension funds and money market funds, can invest only in investment-grade securities; others, such as insurance companies and commercial banks, are restricted to use di¤erent capital amount based on the ratings of assets they hold. Therefore, the quality of credit ratings is essential for the e¤ective operation of the …nancial market, and huge losses could arise if rating agencies fail to provide accurate and timely ratings. The "Big Three" have been widely criticized during the recent global …nancial crisis, including their roles in both the subprime crisis and the on-going European debt crisis. But the criticism itself appears inconsistent. On the one hand, the CRAs are accused of being too cozy with the companies and the …nancial products they rate (rating in ‡ation) and bearing a responsibility for the crisis. Well-known examples are: numerous structured …nance securities or toxic assets were given the highest possible credit ratings before the subprime crisis; Lehman Brothers remained AAA rating right before its bankruptcy, so were Enron (2001) and World.com (2002) . On the other hand, the CRAs are accused of being too focused on a company's or a country's bottom lines and downgrading their ratings without listening to their explanations (rating de ‡ation). For example, in 2007, as housing prices began to tumble, Moody's downgraded 83 percent of the $869 billion mortgage-backed securities it had rated at the AAA level in 2006; on August 5, 2011, S&P downgraded U.S. debt for the …rst time in U.S. history, by one notch from AAA to AA+; since the spring of 2010, one or more of the Big Three put Greece, Portugal, and Ireland to "junk" status, and in January 2012, amid continued eurozone instability, S&P downgraded nine eurozone countries, stripping France and Austria of their triple-A ratings.
Accordingly, existing studies on credit ratings are also mixed and divided into two opposing views (Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2010) . The …rst is the rating de ‡ation view, which argues that there exists a secular tightening trend of rating standards, followed by a downward trend in credit ratings over time. For example, Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) use a panel data on …rms's credit ratings for a sample period of [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] Strahan, 2012) , argues that the issuer-pay business model, the rating shopping, and the competition among rating agencies have reduced CRAs'incentive to provide accurate informative and timely ratings, leading to rating in ‡ation.
In this article, we o¤er a rationale that reconciles the aforementioned two seemingly inconsistent views on CRAs. In a simple two-period reputation model, we show that (i) both rating in ‡ation and rating de ‡ation can occur in equilibrium, and (ii) credit ratings are procyclical: rating in ‡ation is more likely to occur in a boom while rating de ‡ation is more likely to occur in a recession.
In our model, a CRA can be either an honest or an opportunistic type; an investor can be either a sophisticated or naive type; and a security can be either a good or a bad type. The CRA receives a noisy signal about the quality of the security and issues a good or a bad rating upon the request of the security issuer. The issuer will pay for and publish the good ratings, but not the bad ones. The honest CRA always reports the true signal, while the opportunistic CRA chooses the rating to maximize its expected payo¤s. The sophisticated investors update their beliefs rationally, while the naive investors take the ratings at face value.
The opportunistic CRA faces the trade-o¤ between the current bene…t, which is the rating fee paid by the issuer upon receiving a favorable rating, and the future reputation cost. If the reputation cost is su¢ ciently small, the CRA will in ‡ate the rating; if the reputation cost is su¢ ciently large, the CRA will de ‡ate the rating in order to preserve the reputation; only when the reputation cost is in the intermediate range, the CRA will rate truthfully. We then relate the result to business cycles. During the boom, the default probability of the security is low, thus the reputation loss of lying is low, and the opportunistic CRA tends to in ‡ate the rating. During the recession, the default probability of the security is high, thus the reputation cost is high when a good-rating security fails, and the CRA will more likely de ‡ate the rating to preserve its reputation.
Scrutiny on CRAs during the recent …nancial crisis has generated many new studies. Most of them focus on the issue of rating in ‡ation. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) combine three sources for rating in ‡ation: CRAs understating risk to attract business; issuers' rating shopping behavior, and the existence of trusting or naive investors. They show that competition can make the rating in ‡ation problem even worse as it facilitates rating shopping, and rating in ‡ation are more likely to happen during boom when investors are more optimistic. Complementary to Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012), we …nd that in addition to rating in ‡ation, rating de ‡ation is also possible in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that rating is procyclical. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) also discuss credit ratings over business cycles, but they demonstrate that rating quality is countercyclical, that is, a CRA is more likely to issue less accurate ratings in a boom than in a recession. Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2013) study the incentives of CRAs to issue unsolicited ratings, and they show that unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ones. Like Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012), they also …nd that the rating standard is countercyclical. Our procyclical-rating result di¤ers from both Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) and Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2013). 3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 shows how both rating in ‡ation and rating de ‡ation may occur in equilibrium. Section 4 introduces economic states to the model and demonstrates that ratings are procyclical. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We consider a model that builds on Bolton et al. (2012) . There are three kinds of risk-neutral agents: a CRA, issuers, and a unit mass of investors. Issuers seek external funding by selling a security to investors. There are two types of securities: good (e g) or bad ( e b). Good securities do not fail, while bad ones fail with probability p: Both types of securities generate the same return R if not fail, and zero otherwise: All investors and issuers believe ex ante that a security is good with probability )R < r, where r is the reservation return that the investors need for one unit of the investment. Thus, without further information, the investors are not willing to buy the security.
There are two periods, and there is an issuer in each period. At the beginning of period 1, in order to sell the security, the issuer approaches the CRA for a rating. The CRA …rst posts a fee ; then receives a private signal 2 fg; bg with the following information content:
After that, the CRA produces a credit rating: m = G (good) or m = B (bad). Assume (1 (1 )p)R > r; that is, an investor with reliable information that the security is good is willing to purchase it. After observing the rating, the issuer chooses either to buy and publish the rating or not to do so. Proportion of the investors are naive, while the rest are sophisticated, with 0 < 1. Both types of investors observe the rating published. The sophisticated investors know that the CRA can be either the honest type (H) or the opportunistic type (O), and that the ex ante probability of having an honest type is : But the naive investors regard the CRA trustworthy and thus take its rating at face value. The honest CRA will always report the true signal it receives about a security, whereas the opportunistic CRA reports the rating which maximizes its expected payo¤s.
If the security is issued, at the end of the period, both types of investors observe whether it is a success or a failure. The sophisticated investors will then …nd out whether or not the CRA lied by checking the report, the data and the facts. If the CRA is found lying, the sophisticated investors know that the CRA is an opportunistic type for sure. If the CRA is not found lying, the sophisticated investors update their beliefs about the CRA's type accordingly. But the naive investors remain naive: Once the "G" rating security failed, they punish the CRA by ignoring its future reports. Thus, the naive investors are naive both ex ante and ex post: ex ante they take the rating at face value, and ex post they take the results of the security at face value as well.
An investor can purchase either one or zero unit of the security. De…ne:
That is, v represents the value to a naive and trusting investor when the CRA reports m = G; whether truthfully or not. Also, let
where t Pr(e g j G; t) is a sophisticated investor's posterior belief that the project is good after observing a "G" rating at period t, t = 1; 2: Thus, ! t represents the expected value of a security to the sophisticated investor when the CRA reports m = G. Following La¤ont and Tirole (1993) and Bolton et al.(2012) , the second-period payo¤ is weighted by a parameter ; which can be larger than 1. As in Bolton et al.(2012) , the parameter value represents the importance of the future reputation relative to the current gains for the CRA.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the issuer approaches the CRA for a rating for its security.
2. The CRA posts its rating fee , then receives a private signal, and makes a rating of m = G or m = B.
3. The issuer receives the rating and decides whether to buy and publish it. If the security is not issued, there is zero payo¤ to all parties in period 1.
4. If the security is issued, investors observe its price and rating, and each decides whether to purchase one unit or not. At the end of period 1, the investment outcome, success or failure, is realized.
5. The game then moves to the beginning of period 2, whether or not a security is issued in period 1. In the second period, the game in the …rst period is repeated.
We will consider only pure strategies, so that the decisions by all agents are deterministic. Let y (resp. z) be the probability that the opportunistic CRA gives a G (resp. B) rating to a security with good (resp. bad) signal in the …rst period. Then, with pure strategies, y; z 2 f0; 1g:
Equilibrium Analysis
We will discuss three possible equilibria: (1) truthful rating (y = 1; z = 1), where the opportunistic CRA always reports the true signals in period 1; (2) rating in ‡ation (y = 1; z = 0), where the opportunistic CRA gives G rating in period 1 regardless of the signals; and (3) rating de ‡ation (y = 0; z = 1), where the opportunistic CRA issues rating m = B in period 1 no matter what signals it receives. 4 As it will become clear later, the opportunistic CRA will always give the G rating in period 2.
Preliminaries
To facilitate the equilibrium characterization, we start by considering how the investors will update their beliefs and how the CRA will charge fees with di¤erent ratings in di¤erent periods.
Period 1
In period 1, note …rst that the issuer will not pay for a B rating, which makes the rating fee for a B rating equal to zero. Thus, when observing no rating (N ) for the …rst period, the sophisticated investors infer that the rating which the CRA gives for the security must be a B: Thus no security is issued for period 1. Sophisticated investors update their beliefs about the CRA's type using this information:
where Pr (H) = ; Pr (O) = 1 ;
Next, when observing a G rating in period 1, the sophisticated investors believe that the security in consideration is a good type with probability:
where
Thus the sophisticated investors are willing to pay a price no more than
Notice that the issuer can post only a single price. When receiving the G rating, the issuer will post either price v to sell only to the naive investors, or price ! 1 v to sell to all investors, with payo¤s v and ! 1 ; respectively. Under our assumption that the monopoly CRA can extract all the surplus from the issuers, the rating fee that CRA can charge for a G rating in the …rst period is:
At the end of the …rst period, for a G-rated security (which is issued), the investment outcome, success (S) or failure (F ); is realized and observed by all players. The naive investors will continue to believe the CRA if they see a success, and otherwise they will no longer pay attention to the CRA's ratings. For the sophisticated investors, if the CRA lied (i.e., reported G when the signal is b); their updated belief on the probability that CRA is an honest type becomes L 1 = 0; if the CRA did not lie, their updated belief is:
Period 2
In the second period, there is no more reputation concern so that the opportunistic CRA always in ‡ates the rating. If the CRA is not found lying in the …rst period, and after observing the G rating, the sophisticated investors update beliefs that the security is a good type:
corresponding to the four possible situations in period 1: no security was issued; the CRA was caught lying; the CRA reported truthfully and the security was a success or a failure. The probability that the sophisticated investors assign to the security in period 2 as being a good type is:
Therefore, the fees charged in period 2 by the CRA are, with ! 
Equilibrium
We next discuss the three possible equilibrium strategies by the CRA in period 1: truthful rating, rating in ‡ation, and rating de ‡ation.
Truthful rating
Suppose that the CRA reports truthfully in equilibrium, that is, y = 1; z = 1: The sophisticated investors' beliefs are consistent with the CRA's strategy, and we thus have, for i = S; F ; N : With the truthful-rating strategy, conditional on receiving a good signal of the security, the CRA will report "G", and it earns:
as the security will succeed with probability 1 (1 )p and fail with probability (1 )p: Conditional on receiving a bad signal, the CRA will report m = B, and its payo¤ is:
If the CRA deviates to reporting "B" when it receives the "g" signal, its payo¤ is:
If it deviates to reporting "G" when it receives the "b" signal, its payo¤ is:
The CRA will report truthfully if and only if
and
Condition (3) holds if and only if
and condition (4) holds if and only if
Since > 1=2 and maxf v; wg (1 )w < v;
we have
We have thus established:
Lemma 1 There exist values T and T ; with T < T as de…ned in (5) and (6), such that truthful rating by the CRA is an equilibrium if and only if T T :
Rating in ‡ation
The CRA may choose to in ‡ate ratings; that is, y = 1; z = 0: The sophisticated investors'beliefs are consistent with the CRA's strategy in equilibrium. In this case, With the rating-in ‡ation strategy, conditional on a bad signal, the CRA will report m = G. In this case, the CRA can collect the rating fee, but it will be found lying by the sophisticated investors and thus they will not buy in period 2, while the naive investors will only purchase in period 2 if the security succeeds in period 1 (which occurs with 1 p). Therefore, the CRA's payo¤ is:
Also, with the rating-in ‡ation strategy, the CRA will report m = G conditional on a good signal, and the CRA's payo¤ in this case is: In the rating-in ‡ation regime, the sophisticated investors believe that the opportunistic CRA always reports G. Once they …nd that there is no reporting, they know it must be a B rating, and they hold the belief that the CRA giving the B-rating is an honest type. Therefore, 
Therefore, rating-in ‡ation is an equilibrium strategy if and only if (7) holds. Notice that
We therefore have:
Lemma 2 Rating in ‡ation is an equilibrium if and only if
I ; where 0 < I T :
Thus, when the reputation concern is small, the CRA has incentive to in ‡ate ratings for short-term gains.
Rating de ‡ation
The CRA may choose to de ‡ate the ratings, that is, y = 0; z = 1: In such an equilibrium,
Note that D 1 = 0 since the issuer will not pay for a B rating. With the rating-de ‡ation strategy, conditional on receiving a good signal, the CRA reports m = B, with payo¤:
Conditional on receiving a bad signal, the CRA also reports m = B, and its payo¤ is:
In the rating-de ‡ation regime, the CRA may deviate to report m = G. Since the sophisticated investors believe that the opportunistic CRA always de ‡ates the ratings in this regime, once they see G report, they believe that the CRA is an honest type. Then Therefore, this deviation when receiving a g signal brings payo¤:
Or, after receiving a bad signal, the CRA may deviate to report m = G, and the payo¤ from this deviation is:
Notice that
Therefore, the rating-de ‡ation strategy is an equilibrium strategy if and only if
Lemma 3 Assume that
Then, given ; there exists a number
such that rating-de ‡ation is an equilibrium if and only if D , with It follows that
Thus, for the rating-de ‡ation equilibrium to exist, the proportion of naive investors need to be large enough, and the CRA need to have su¢ ciently strong concerns for reputation.
Summarizing the …ndings from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we have our …rst main result below, providing the equilibrium characterization: When choosing rating strategy, the opportunistic CRA faces a trade-o¤ between the current bene…t and the future reputation cost. Proposition 1 shows that when the reputation parameter is su¢ ciently low such that the reputation loss will be small, the CRA in ‡ates the rating; when the reputation parameter and the proportion of naive investors are su¢ ciently high such that the reputation loss is large, the CRA de ‡ates the rating in order to preserve the reputation; only when the reputation parameter is in the intermediate range, the CRA will provide truthful ratings.
Rating de ‡ation helps to preserve reputation, due to the following reason: The private signal of the CRA is noisy. Even if the CRA reports truthfully the good signal, the security may fail with probability (1 )p: When a G-rating security is a failure, the naive investors will punish the CRA by ignoring its report in the future. If the proportion of naive investors is su¢ ciently high ( >^ ) and if future pro…t is su¢ ciently important, by reporting m = B, the CRA gives up the current rating fee but preserves its reputation because it will not be perceived as having in ‡ated the rating, given that the security is not issued at all.
It is interesting that the existence of naive investors can motivate both ratingin ‡ation and rating-de ‡ation. While the opportunistic CRA may take advantage of the naive investors'ex ante trust to in ‡ate ratings (Bolton et al., 2012) , our analysis shows that the ex post punishment by the naive investors once a G-rating security fails may also prompt the opportunistic CRA to de ‡ate ratings. However, as we shall see shortly, the existence of naive investors is a necessary condition for rating de ‡ation, but not for rating in ‡ation.
The next result states how changes in the two key parameters of our model, and ; may a¤ect the equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 1 (i) The opportunistic CRA is more likely to in ‡ate or de ‡ate its rating when the portion of naive investors ( ) is higher. 5 (ii) Suppose that > w v : Then, the opportunistic CRA is more likely to provide truthful rating when the private signal is more accurate (i.e., is higher).
Proof. (i) Since
we have ; it is straightforward to verify that
Therefore the opportunistic CRA is more likely to provide truthful rating when is higher.
In the rating-in ‡ation regime, the parameter value determines the potential revenue from the naive investors. Keeping other things constant, a higher implies a larger I , and hence there is a larger region of parameter values under which the CRA in ‡ates the rating. In the rating-de ‡ation regime, the parameter value determines the punishment intensity if the G-rating security fails. Holding other things constant, a higher implies a smaller D , and thus there is a larger region of parameter values under which the CRA de ‡ates the rating. ; but there is no rating de ‡ation. Hence the presence of naive investors is necessary for equilibrium rating de ‡ation but not necessary for rating in ‡ation.
Corollary 1 also says that when the private signal is more accurate ( is higher), the CRA will be more likely to report the true signal, provided that the proportion of naive investors is su¢ ciently large ( > w v ). This is intuitive, because a more accurate private signal implies a higher cost of mis-reporting, increasing the incentive for truthful rating.
We also notice that when p is small (more likely in boom), rating in ‡ation is more likely to happen; when p is large (more likely in recession), rating de ‡ation is more likely to happen. We formalize this observation in the next section.
Ratings and Business Cycle
In this section we introduce state variables to discuss the relationship between credit ratings and the business cycle. Suppose there are two states s 2 fh; lg; where h corresponds to high economic activities or a boom, and l to low economic activities or a recession. We assume that the probability of failure for the securities is lower under boom than under recession: p h < p l . For simplicity, everything else is assumed to be the same in the two state. It follows that v h > v l ; w h > w l ; and k h > k l :
Let s be the probability that the current state s will remain in the next period. Then 1 s is the transition probability from the current state s to the other state. For s 2 fh; lg and s 6 = s; if s = 1 s , the state in each period is an i.i.d draw from the same distribution; if s > 1 s ; there is a positive correlation between states; and if s < 1 s , there is a negative correlation between states. A higher s means a longer duration for the state s and a slow move to the other state. The following is the transition matrix:
The transition matrix and the nature of the state in each period are assumed to be public information. Denote:
Then, given that the current state is s; v s is the expected willingness to pay by a trusting naive investor for the G-rated security in the next period; w s is the expected willingness to pay by a sophisticated investor, when the CRA was truthful in the current period, for the G-rated security in the next period; and k s is the expected willingness to pay by a sophisticated investor, when the CRA gave a B-rating in the current period, for the G-rated security in the next period. We further de…ne, for s 2 fh; lg:
Then, similarly as in the previous section, we have Similar to Proposition 1, when the reputation parameter s is su¢ ciently small, the CRA in ‡ates the rating; when the reputation parameter and the proportion of naive investors are su¢ ciently large ( s >^ h ), the CRA de ‡ates the rating; when the reputation parameter is in the intermediate range, the CRA reports the true signal.
Proposition 2 below states our second main result, connecting ratings to business cycles.
Proposition 2 Rating in ‡ation is more likely to happen in a boom; and there exists 2 (0; 1); such that for > , rating de ‡ation is more likely to happen in a recession.
Proof. We can rewrite l ( l ; p l ); which would imply that the equilibrium condition for rating in ‡ation is more likely to be satis…ed in state h than in state l:
First, since
It follows that
We show that there exists 2 (0; 1); suvh that for > ,
This would imply that the equilibrium condition for rating de ‡ation is more likely to be satis…ed in state l than in state h:
Hence, since
Next, we show that there exists 2 (0; 1) such that for > ,
De…ne maxf
Remarkably, regardless of whether the states are independent or correlated across periods, we have ; that is, the range of parameter values for the equilibrium of rating in ‡ation is larger in a boom, whereas the range of parameter values for the equilibrium of rating de ‡ation is larger in a recession. In this sense, CRA's credit ratings are procyclical: rating in ‡ation is more likely to happen in a boom, while rating de ‡ation is more likely to happen in a recession.
The intuition for the procyclical-rating result is as follows. Since the probability of failure for the bad security is lower in a boom than in a recession (p h < p l ), the expected payo¤ of issuing the security (and hence also the CRA's rating fee) is higher in the boom than in the recession (v h > v l ; w h > w l ; and k h > k l ). Consequently, relative to in a recession, in a boom the current gain from rating in ‡ation is higher, and the expected reputation cost of rating in ‡ation is also lower. Therefore, the opportunistic CRA has more incentive to in ‡ate the ratings in a boom. On the other hand, the current loss from rating de ‡ation is lower in a recession than in a boom. Thus, the opportunistic CRA is more likely to de ‡ate ratings in a recession in order to reap the future gain.
Conclusion
CRAs have been under intense scrutiny since the recent global …nancial crisis. They were initially criticized for their favorable pre-crisis ratings of insolvent …nancial institutions like Lehman Brothers and AIG, as well as risky mortgage-related securities that contributed to the collapse of the U.S. housing market. When the crisis started, the CRAs began to massively downgrade the ratings for many securities, companies, as well as countries.
Exiting literature as well as business practitioners have two competing views regarding the CRAs' behavior: some argue that they engage in rating in ‡ation, while others think they de ‡ate the ratings. This article provides an analysis that reconciles the two opposite arguments. We …nd that both rating in ‡ation and rating de ‡ation can occur in equilibrium. In addition, we …nd that credit rating is procyclical: rating in ‡ation is more likely to happen in a boom while rating de ‡ation is more likely to happen in a recession.
Our procyclical rating result is consistent with some recent empirical works. Several recent papers have documented evidences that ratings in ‡ation is more likely to happen during booms. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) point out the issuance volume of MBS went up sharply between 2005-2007 while rating accuracy decreased, and later rating downgrades for the 2005-2007 cohorts were signi…cantly larger than for the previous one. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) show that there were massive pre-crisis upgrading compared to the massive downgrading during the subprime crisis. In an earlier study, Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) demonstrate that during the East Asian …nancial crisis, CRAs' ratings were procyclical: Having failed to predict the emergence of the crisis, CRAs became excessively conservative. They downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than these countries' economic fundamentals would justify.
As a response to the CRAs' moral hazard problem, the US government has attempted to improve or tighten the regulation. Subtitle C in Title IX of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act focuses entirely on the regulation of CRAs, referred to as Nationally recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). Some key elements of the provisions in Title IX Subsection C are:
Disclosure. NRSROs are required to disclose their rating track records, their rating methodologies, and their use of third parties for due diligence e¤orts.
Liability. Investors can bring private rights of action against CRAs for a knowing or reckless failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts or to obtain analysis from an independent source.
Deregister. The SEC has the authority to deregister any agency for providing bad ratings over time.
These requirements are likely to increase CRAs'e¤orts and reduce the moral hazard problem. For example, the disclosure principle allows investors to have more information, and thus to make more rational judgements when using credit ratings. However, these requirements mainly target rating in ‡ation, and may exacerbate the problem of rating de ‡ation. Facing legal liability, CRAs may reduce the number of ratings as well as increase the downward bias in ratings (Goel and Thakor, 2010) , which could hurt the issuers. It seems that more studies are needed with regard to the consequences of the legislation.
Most of the recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, focus on the rating in ‡ation occurred before the …nancial crisis. But we do observe the phenomenon that when the crisis started, the CRAs became much more conservative by massively downgrading the ratings. Is the downgrading merely a correction to the previous rating in ‡ation? Or does it involve rating de ‡ation, downgrading more than the fundamentals would justify? Are there rating cycles, and are ratings procyclical? Given that credit ratings serve as public coordinating devices and that downgrading has major impacts in …nancial markets (Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2005) , this article calls for more research on these critical issues.
